Blue Team
Introduction
Blue Team Fundamentals, Logs, SIEM Thinking, IOCs & an Introduction to MITRE ATT&CK
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What We're Covering Today
Blue Team Fundamentals
Who defenders are, what they own, and how they think
What Is "Blue Team"?
The defensive side of cybersecurity, the people, process, and tooling that keep an organization's systems standing.
- Owns detection, response, and hardening, not just firewalls and antivirus
- Operates continuously: attackers don't work business hours
- Judged by one question, how fast did we notice, and how fast did we act?
Red, Blue & Purple
Red Team
Offense. Simulates real adversaries under controlled rules of engagement to find gaps before attackers do.
Blue Team
Defense. Detects, responds to, and hardens against intrusions. Owns the SOC.
Purple Team
Not a separate team: a way of working. Red executes a technique, Blue tries to catch it, both sides compare notes and close the gap.
The Mission, in Six Functions
Most Blue Team programs are built around the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF 2.0), six functions covering the full lifecycle of managing risk.
CSF 2.0 (2024) added Govern as the sixth function. This guide lives mostly in Detect, with a foot in Respond.
Who's on the Team
Today's labs walk the Tier 1 → Detection Engineer path: triage, then investigate, then build a rule.
The Blue Team Mindset
How Attacks Unfold: the Cyber Kill Chain
Lockheed Martin's model breaks an intrusion into stages. Every stage is a chance to break the chain.
Later today we'll meet MITRE ATT&CK, a far more detailed map of this same territory.
Logs, SIEM Thinking & IOCs
Turning raw noise into a signal worth acting on
What Is a Log?
A timestamped record of an event, who did what, where, and when.
- Generated constantly, by nearly everything: OS, apps, network gear, cloud services
- On its own, one log line rarely means much
- Blue Team's job is to find the lines that matter, and the pattern across many that don't
Where Logs Come From
| Authentication | Who logged in, from where, and whether it workedWindows Security Event Log · /var/log/auth.log |
|---|---|
| Network / Firewall | Which connections were allowed or blocked |
| DNS | What domains a host resolved, often the first sign of C2 or exfil |
| Web / Proxy | HTTP requests, user-agents, response codes |
| EDR / Antivirus | Process, file, and registry activity on the endpoint |
| Cloud | Who did what in your cloud consoleCloudTrail · Azure Activity Log |
The Log Triage Pipeline
Case File 01: Reading the Log
- 1Same source IP, every attempt, not a typo, a pattern
- 2Five failures in under twenty seconds, no human types that fast
- 3Then... a success. This is the line that should worry you most.
We'll come back to this exact log in Case File 02, and in tonight's labs.
What Is a SIEM?
Security Information and Event Management, pulls logs from everywhere and gives you one place to search, correlate, and get alerted.
- Aggregation, every log source, one index
- Correlation, connect events that mean something together
- Alerting, flag activity that matches a rule
- Dashboards, see the state of your environment at a glance
The SIEM Landscape
| Splunk | Industry standard; powerful search language (SPL) |
|---|---|
| Elastic Stack | Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana, open-source-friendly |
| Microsoft Sentinel | Cloud-native, tight Azure / Microsoft 365 integration |
| Wazuh | Open-source, a strong choice for learning and home labs |
| Prometheus + Loki + Grafana | Lighter metrics-and-logs stack, popular when a full SIEM is overkill |
SIEM Thinking: Correlation & Tuning
A correlation rule is a hypothesis: "if X and Y happen within Z time, something's wrong."
What Is an IOC?
Indicator of Compromise, an observable artifact suggesting malicious activity happened.
File Hash
MD5 / SHA-1 / SHA-256
IP Address
A known-bad or C2 host
Domain / URL
Phishing or C2 infrastructure
Email address
A sender or reply-to used in a campaign
File name / path
Where malware drops or hides
Registry key
Persistence artifacts on Windows
IOC vs. IOA
IOC: Indicator of Compromise
"What happened." A static artifact: a hash, a domain. Cheap for an attacker to change.
IOA: Indicator of Attack
"What's happening." A behavior: e.g. a process spawning a shell with an encoded command. Expensive for an attacker to change without changing their whole approach.
MITRE ATT&CK Introduction
A shared language for describing how adversaries actually operate
What Is MITRE ATT&CK?
Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge, a free, globally-accessible knowledge base of real-world adversary behavior, maintained by MITRE.
- Not a tool. A map, and a shared vocabulary the whole industry uses
- Built from real intrusions, not theory
- Used by vendors, threat intel teams, red teams, and blue teams alike
Tactics → Techniques → Procedures
The Enterprise Matrix
Fifteen tactics. Each one answers: what is the adversary trying to achieve right now?
The framework is alive: in April 2026 (v19), MITRE split Defense Evasion into Stealth (TA0005, hiding) and Defense Impairment (TA0112, breaking your tools). Don't memorize this list, know how to look it up.
Case File 02: Same Incident, ATT&CK View
Recall the SSH log from Case File 01, five rapid failures against root, then a success.
Repeated guesses against one account from one source = Password Guessing. Cycling one password across many accounts instead would be Password Spraying (T1110.003).
Why Blue Teams Use ATT&CK
- Common language, a report, a rule, and a briefing can all point at the same technique ID
- Coverage mapping, see which techniques you can actually detect, and where the gaps are
- Threat-informed defense, prioritize based on what real adversaries in your sector do
- Purple teaming, Red emulates a technique, Blue validates the detection, both sides close the loop
ATT&CK Navigator turns your coverage into a heat map, green where you can detect, red where you can't.
Hands-on Labs
Triage it, map it, then build the rule that would have caught it
Lab 01: Log Triage
A mixed batch of log lines, some routine, some not. Find the ones that matter, and say why.
Task: flag the lines worth escalating. For each, say what makes it suspicious versus routine.
Lab 02: Attack Identification
Take what you flagged in Lab 01 and map each one to a MITRE ATT&CK tactic and technique.
| Observed | Tactic | Technique |
|---|---|---|
| Lines 3-6, SSH brute force | Credential Access | Brute Force · T1110.001 |
| Line 8, encoded PowerShell | ? | ? |
| Line 9, maria's second login | ? | ? |
Show suggested mapping
Line 8: Execution (TA0002), Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell (T1059.001). The -enc flag and hidden window are also an attempt at Stealth (TA0005), obfuscating and hiding, not breaking tools, so this procedure reasonably maps to both.
Line 9: No tactic. Same user, same source IP, plausible hours, this is expected behavior. Correctly ruling something out is as important as flagging something.
Lab 03: Write a Detection Rule
Turn Case File 01 into a rule that would catch it automatically next time, using Sigma, a vendor-neutral rule format most SIEMs understand.
Task: adjust the threshold and timespan for your environment. What's a realistic false-positive scenario for this rule?
Show one reasonable answer
A shared jump box or NAT gateway where several real users legitimately fail-then-succeed could trip this rule.
Tune by: raising the threshold for known shared hosts, or adding a filter block that excludes trusted source IPs from the count.
Key Takeaways
- Blue Team defends continuously, detect, respond, protect, recover, and govern the whole thing
- Logs are the raw material; a SIEM turns them into something searchable and alertable
- IOCs tell you something happened, IOAs tell you something is happening
- MITRE ATT&CK gives everyone, vendors, analysts, reports, the same vocabulary for adversary behavior
- Good detections start as a hypothesis, get tuned against real noise, and stay attached to a technique ID
Resources & Next Steps
Thanks, questions welcome.