LAYER 1
Physical Layer Attacks
| Attack Name | Description | How to Detect (Symptoms) | Layer | Impact | How to Protect |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Electromagnetic Sniffing EMI Eavesdropping / Van Eck HIGH |
An attacker uses a passive induction probe (Rogowski coil or close-range antenna) near a copper UTP cable to reconstruct data signals without any physical contact to the wire. |
|
L1 | Confidential data exfiltration; undetectable by network tools | Shielded cable (STP/FTP)Fiber opticPhysical access controlTEMPEST shieldingEnd-to-end encryption |
Fiber Optic Tapping Optical Bend Attack HIGH |
The attacker slightly bends a fiber optic cable to induce radiation loss from the core, then places an optical coupler to capture a fraction of the light signal without breaking the connection. |
|
L1 | Silent data interception; no network-layer trace | OTDR monitoringFiber conduit & locked ductsOptical power monitoringEnd-to-end encryption (MACsec/IPsec) |
Unlocked Port Attack Rogue Device Connection CRITICAL |
An attacker connects an unauthorized device (laptop, Raspberry Pi) to an unused, unlocked RJ45 port or an open network bay to sniff traffic, launch MiTM attacks, or pivot internally. |
|
L1 | Full network access; platform for MiTM, pivoting, data theft | 802.1X port authentication (NAC)Port security (MAC limiting)Disable unused portsPhysical locks on baysCCTV / anti-tamper sensors |
Console Port Attack Evil Maid / Out-of-Band CRITICAL |
Physical access to UART/RS-232 or mini-USB console ports on routers/switches, which are typically unencrypted and require no network authentication, gives full device control. |
|
L1 | Complete device takeover; config modification; credential extraction | Lock server rooms / network baysConsole port password + timeoutTamper-evident sealsTamper-detection switchesAnti-tamper screws |
Supply Chain Firmware Attack Hardware Backdoor CRITICAL |
Network equipment is delivered with pre-compromised firmware that can exfiltrate data, open backdoors, or disable security features from the moment of first power-on. |
|
L1 | Persistent undetectable backdoor; full device compromise from day zero | Verify firmware hashesTrusted vendor sourcingSecure bootOut-of-band integrity checksNetwork baseline monitoring |
Radio Jamming RF Interference / DoS Wireless HIGH |
An attacker emits strong radio signals on the same frequency (2.4 GHz / 5 GHz) as a Wi-Fi network, preventing legitimate devices from communicating (physical-layer DoS). |
|
L1 | Total wireless outage; can be used as cover for other attacks | Frequency hopping (802.11n/ac)WIPS (Wireless IPS)Wired backup pathsRF shieldingSpectrum monitoring |
LAYER 2
Data Link Layer Attacks
| Attack Name | Description | How to Detect (Symptoms) | Layer | Impact | How to Protect |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
ARP Spoofing ARP Poisoning / MiTM CRITICAL |
The attacker broadcasts forged ARP replies, associating their MAC address with a legitimate IP (e.g., the gateway). Victims update their ARP cache and send traffic through the attacker, classic Man-in-the-Middle. |
|
L2 | Traffic interception, credential theft, session hijacking, data manipulation | Dynamic ARP Inspection (DAI)DHCP SnoopingStatic ARP entries (critical hosts)MACsec (802.1AE)HTTPS / TLS everywherearpwatch monitoring |
MAC Flooding CAM Table Overflow HIGH |
The attacker floods the switch with thousands of frames having random source MAC addresses (macof), exhausting the CAM table. The switch enters fail-open mode and broadcasts all frames on all ports, functioning as a hub. |
|
L2 | Full LAN traffic exposure; reconnaissance; enables further MiTM attacks | Port Security (max MAC = 2)Violation shutdownStorm Control802.1X NACCAM table size limits |
VLAN Hopping Double Tagging Attack HIGH |
The attacker crafts frames with two 802.1Q VLAN tags (outer = native VLAN, inner = target VLAN). The switch strips the outer tag and forwards the frame into the target VLAN, bypassing segmentation without requiring a router. |
|
L2 | Unauthorized access to sensitive VLANs (admin, servers); VLAN isolation bypass | Change native VLAN to unused VLAN (e.g. 999)switchport nonegotiateExplicit trunk VLAN allow lists802.1X on access ports |
Rogue DHCP Server DHCP Spoofing HIGH |
The attacker runs a fake DHCP server that responds to client DISCOVER requests faster than the legitimate server, handing out a malicious default gateway and DNS server, redirecting all traffic through the attacker. |
|
L2 | Full MiTM position; DNS poisoning; credential interception | DHCP Snooping (trust only uplink ports)IP Source GuardDAIDHCP lease monitoring802.1X |
STP Hijacking Rogue Root Bridge CRITICAL |
The attacker sends forged BPDUs with priority 0, claiming to be the Root Bridge. STP reconverges, making traffic flow through the attacker's device. Combined with MAC flooding, enables total LAN interception. |
|
L2 | Total traffic interception across all VLANs; network instability; loop risk | BPDU Guard (all access ports)Root Guard (distribution ports)PortFast on end-host portsspanning-tree vlan X root primaryStorm Control |
Wi-Fi Deauthentication 802.11 DoS / Evil Twin setup HIGH |
Attacker sends spoofed 802.11 deauthentication frames (which are unauthenticated in WPA2) forcing clients to disconnect. Used as DoS or to force reconnection to a rogue access point (Evil Twin). |
|
L2 | Wireless DoS; credential capture via Evil Twin; WPA handshake capture for cracking | 802.11w (Management Frame Protection)WPA3WIPS/WIDSCertificate-based auth (EAP-TLS)Rogue AP detection |
LAYER 3
Network Layer Attacks
| Attack Name | Description | How to Detect (Symptoms) | Layer | Impact | How to Protect |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
IP Spoofing Source Address Forgery CRITICAL |
The attacker forges the IP source address field (not validated by IP itself) to impersonate another host, bypass IP-based ACLs, hide identity, or as a vector for amplification DDoS attacks. |
|
L3 | ACL bypass; identity masking; foundation for DDoS amplification; non-repudiation failure | BCP38 / uRPF (ingress filtering)ACL blocking bogon sourcesISP egress filteringIPsec authenticationNetFlow anomaly detection |
ICMP Flood Ping Flood / DoS HIGH |
The attacker sends a massive continuous stream of ICMP Echo Request packets (using hping3 or Scapy with inter=0.001) to saturate the target's bandwidth and exhaust CPU resources processing each request. |
|
L3 | Service unavailability; CPU exhaustion; collateral impact on all hosted services | ICMP rate limiting (iptables -m limit)Block unnecessary ICMP types (FW)Baseline alerting on ICMP volumeUpstream DDoS scrubbing |
Smurf Attack ICMP Amplification (Historical) HISTORICAL |
The attacker sends ICMP Echo Requests to a broadcast address with the victim's IP spoofed as source. All hosts on the broadcast network reply to the victim simultaneously, amplifying traffic by the number of hosts. |
|
L3 | Amplified DoS; network saturation; historically could take down ISP links | Disable directed broadcast on routers (no ip directed-broadcast)BCP38 ingress filteringBlock ICMP at border FW |
Ping of Death Malformed Fragmentation (Historical) HISTORICAL |
The attacker sends IP fragments that, when reassembled, form an ICMP packet larger than 65535 bytes (max IP). Older unpatched OS kernels crash or reboot during the malformed reassembly. |
|
L3 | System crash / reboot (DoS); no impact on patched modern OS | OS patching (all modern OS immune)Firewall fragment inspectionIDS signature detection |
Teardrop Attack Overlapping Fragment DoS (Historical) HISTORICAL |
The attacker sends IP fragments with overlapping offset fields. When the target OS tries to reassemble the overlapping fragments, it encounters memory confusion and crashes on vulnerable (unpatched) systems. |
|
L3 | System crash / kernel panic; DoS on legacy unpatched OS | OS patchingDrop suspicious fragments at FWFragment reassembly limits |
ICMP Redirect Attack Routing MiTM via ICMP HIGH |
The attacker sends a forged ICMP Redirect message (Type 5) to a host, convincing it to use the attacker's machine as the "better gateway" for certain destinations, silently redirecting all matching traffic. |
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L3 | Silent MiTM; traffic interception; complete session monitoring | Disable ICMP Redirect acceptance on hosts (sysctl)Filter ICMP Redirect at FWStatic routes for critical pathsIPsec |
ICMP Tunneling Covert C2 / Data Exfiltration HIGH |
The attacker embeds arbitrary data (C2 commands, exfiltrated files) in the payload field of ICMP Echo packets. Most firewalls allow ICMP ping and don't inspect payloads, creating a covert channel. |
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L3 | Data exfiltration bypassing FW; persistent C2 channel; undetected malware beaconing | Deep Packet Inspection of ICMP payloadsRestrict ICMP to trusted hosts onlyNDR behavioral baselineNGFW application-layer inspection |
RIP Route Injection Routing Protocol Poisoning HIGH |
On networks running RIPv1 (no auth) or poorly configured RIPv2, the attacker (internal host or virtual router) announces a fake prefix with a better metric (e.g., hop count = 1). Routers install the poisoned route and forward traffic to the attacker. |
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L3 | Traffic redirection (MiTM); blackhole creation; inter-VLAN traffic interception | RIPv2 MD5 authentication (all interfaces)Prefix lists (only accept expected prefixes)ACL on UDP/520 (allow only known peers)Migrate to OSPF/EIGRP with auth |
BGP Prefix Hijacking BGP Hijack / Route Theft CRITICAL |
A malicious or compromised AS announces a more specific prefix (e.g. /25 vs /24) that belongs to another AS. BGP best-path selection prefers longer prefixes, causing the internet to route victim traffic to the attacker's AS. |
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L3 | Internet-scale traffic interception; service outage; certificate / BGP session hijacking | RPKI / ROV (Route Origin Validation)IRR filteringBGP max-prefix limitsBGP MD5 / TCP-AO authenticationBGPsec (path validation) |
BGP Route Leak Route Propagation Violation HIGH |
An AS accidentally or maliciously re-announces routes learned from one peer to another peer, violating routing policies. Can cause mass traffic redirection through an unprepared AS (sometimes causing Internet outages). |
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L3 | Regional or global traffic rerouting; latency spikes; potential interception | Explicit BGP export policiesNo re-announce by defaultMax-prefix session limitsRPKI ROVIRR registration |
OSPF LSA Falsification Link-State Poisoning HIGH |
Without OSPF authentication (or with weak MD5), an attacker sends forged LSAs (Link State Advertisements) claiming fake topology, creating blackholes, redirect paths, or routing instability across the OSPF area. |
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L3 | Routing blackholes; traffic redirection; network instability; DoS | OSPF MD5 / SHA authentication (all interfaces)Passive interfaces on non-router portsOSPF area segmentationSIEM alerting on LSA anomalies |
LAYER 4
Transport Layer Attacks
| Attack Name | Description | How to Detect (Symptoms) | Layer | Impact | How to Protect |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
TCP SYN Flood Half-Open Connection Exhaustion CRITICAL |
The attacker sends massive numbers of TCP SYN packets (often with spoofed source IPs) without completing the 3-way handshake. The server allocates a TCB (half-open connection) for each SYN, eventually exhausting its connection table. |
|
L4 | Service unavailability; server resource exhaustion; all TCP services affected | SYN cookies (RFC 4987)Rate limiting SYN packets (iptables)Firewall state table limitsSCTP (cookie-based handshake)Upstream DDoS scrubbing |
Session Hijacking TCP Session Takeover CRITICAL |
After passively sniffing or predicting TCP sequence numbers, the attacker injects forged packets with the correct sequence numbers into an active session, taking control away from the legitimate client. |
|
L4 | Unauthorized actions on behalf of authenticated user; data theft; account compromise | Encrypted sessions (TLS 1.3)Random initial sequence numbers (OS-level)Short session timeoutsApplication-level re-authentication |
TCP RST Attack Connection Reset Injection HIGH |
The attacker sends forged TCP RST (reset) packets with the correct sequence number to an active connection. Both endpoints immediately terminate the connection, believing the other side requested it. |
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L4 | Session disruption; denial of service for long-lived connections (BGP, VPN); transaction loss | TCP-AO (Authentication Option, RFC 5925)IPsec ESP for session protectionFirewall stateful trackingTLS session continuity |
UDP Amplification / Flood Reflection DDoS (DNS, NTP, SSDP) CRITICAL |
Using IP spoofing, the attacker sends small requests to UDP services (DNS, NTP, Memcached) with the victim's IP as source. The servers send much larger responses to the victim, amplification factor can exceed 50,000x for Memcached. |
|
L4 | Multi-Gbps DDoS; complete network saturation; collateral damage to ISP infrastructure | BCP38 to prevent IP spoofing at sourceRate-limit UDP responses (server-side)Disable open recursive DNS / public NTPUpstream DDoS mitigation (Akamai, Cloudflare) |
Port Exhaustion Ephemeral Port Starvation MEDIUM |
The attacker rapidly opens thousands of connections to the target, consuming all available ephemeral ports (typically 1024-65535) on the server or NAT gateway, preventing any new connections from legitimate clients. |
|
L4 | Service unavailability for new connections; effective DoS without flooding | Connection limits per source IP (FW)Reduce TIME_WAIT timeoutSO_REUSEPORT socket optionRate limiting per client |
Fragment Overlap Attack IDS Evasion via Fragmentation HIGH |
The attacker sends packets split into small fragments that individually appear benign, but when reassembled by the target contain malicious content that was hidden from IDS/IPS which only inspects fragments individually. |
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L4 | IDS/IPS bypass; delivery of exploits that should have been blocked | NGFW full-reassembly inspection before processingDrop fragments below minimum sizeFragment timeout limitsNormalize fragmented traffic |
LAYER 7+
Application Layer & Multi-Stage Attacks
| Attack Name | Description | How to Detect (Symptoms) | Layer | Impact | How to Protect |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
SQL Injection SQLi / DB Exfiltration CRITICAL |
Attacker injects SQL code into input fields (e.g., admin' OR '1'='1' -- in login forms). The application passes the malicious query to the database, potentially bypassing authentication or exposing all data. |
|
L7 | Full database compromise; authentication bypass; data exfiltration; initial foothold in APT | Parameterized queries / prepared statementsWAF (Web Application Firewall)Input validation & sanitizationLeast-privilege DB accountsSIEM alerting on SQL patterns |
DNS Tunneling DNS Covert Channel / Exfiltration HIGH |
Data is encoded into DNS query/response fields (TXT, CNAME records). Since DNS is rarely blocked or inspected, this creates a covert bidirectional channel for C2 communication or data exfiltration through corporate firewalls. |
|
L7 | Data exfiltration bypassing DLP; persistent C2 channel; undetected over long periods | DNS query rate limitingInspect TXT record content (NGFW)DNS RPZ (Response Policy Zones)Suricata/Sigma DNS tunneling rulesDNS traffic baseline anomaly detection |
Pass-the-Hash Credential Reuse / Lateral Movement CRITICAL |
After compromising one machine, the attacker extracts NTLM password hashes from memory (without knowing the plaintext). These hashes are directly used to authenticate to other Windows systems via SMB/WMI, no cracking needed. |
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L7 | Rapid lateral movement; privilege escalation; domain compromise | Windows Credential GuardDisable NTLM (enforce Kerberos)Tiered Admin Model (PAW)EDR on all endpointsNetwork segmentation / micro-seg |
Phishing + Macro Attack Spear Phishing / VBA Payload CRITICAL |
Attacker sends a crafted email with a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. When the user enables macros, the macro downloads and executes a payload via HTTPS (port 443), establishing a C2 channel that bypasses firewall inspection. |
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L7 | Initial access in APT kill chain; C2 establishment; ransomware delivery; credential theft | Disable macros by default (GPO)Email filtering (sandbox detonation)NGFW TLS inspection (port 443)User awareness trainingEDR behavioral detection |
Ransomware (Multi-Stage) APT Ransomware / Wiper CRITICAL |
Following initial access (phishing), the attacker moves laterally via SMB/RDP with stolen credentials, then deploys ransomware that encrypts files on all reachable file shares. All stages use legitimate protocols to evade detection. |
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L7 | Complete data loss / encryption; business disruption; regulatory consequences; multi-million € ransom | Immutable offline backups (3-2-1 rule)EDR + anti-ransomware moduleNetwork micro-segmentation (block SMB spread)Disable RDP or require MFAZero Trust architectureIncident Response Plan |
APT, SQL → PtH → SCADA Advanced Persistent Threat Kill Chain CRITICAL |
Full multi-stage APT (as in the SOC scenario): SQL injection on DMZ web app → brute-force internal service account → Pass-the-Hash lateral movement → pivot to OT/SCADA via misconfigured IT/OT firewall → write SCADA register to open circuit breaker → DNS tunneling for data exfiltration. |
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L3-L7 | Physical infrastructure damage (power outage); mass data exfiltration; regulatory / safety consequences | WAF on DMZ web appsMFA on all accountsPatch AD (6-month lag = critical)Strict IT/OT firewall rules (no inherit)Encrypted S7comm (TLS)EDR on all IT endpointsNDR + SIEM correlationSOAR auto-isolation playbooks |